10-28-2019, 01:19 AM
Now, think about user accounts. You don't want every Tom, Dick, and Harry logging in with admin rights. I remember tweaking a client's server where they had way too many domain admins floating around. So, I stripped that down, enforcing the principle of least privilege-you give users just enough access to do their job, nothing more. And for service accounts? Those things run your apps in the background. I make sure to create dedicated ones for each service, with long, complex passwords that don't expire right away, but you rotate them regularly anyway. Otherwise, if one gets compromised, it doesn't cascade to everything else. You can set this up in Active Directory Users and Computers, just right-click and adjust the properties. But watch out, because if you lock an account too tight, your own scripts might fail when they try to authenticate.
Or take built-in accounts like Guest. You disable that immediately, don't you? I always do, because it's a wide-open door for anyone sniffing around. And Administrator? Rename it, change its default password, and tuck it away. I've had situations where scripts relied on the old name, so test everything after. You enforce account lockout policies too-say, after five failed logins, it locks for 30 minutes. That stops brute-force attacks cold. I set mine to monitor for unusual patterns, and you can tie that into event logs for alerts. But don't make the lockout too aggressive, or legit users will hate you when they fat-finger their password.
Passwords themselves, though-they're the real frontline. You know I push for at least 12 characters, mixing uppercase, lowercase, numbers, and symbols. Complexity rules in Group Policy let you mandate that. I avoid the old eight-character minimum; it's too easy to crack these days. And password history? Keep the last 24 in memory so users can't just cycle back to their favorite weak one. You set the maximum age to 90 days, forcing changes every quarter. But I give a grace period for the first login if it's a new account. Expiration warnings pop up 14 days early, nagging users without being obnoxious. I've seen admins forget to notify, and then boom, accounts lock out en masse on expiration day.
Also, consider smart card or certificate requirements for high-privilege logons. You enable that in the security options, making it harder for remote attacks. I use it for RDP sessions on my servers. And don't overlook fine-grained password policies if you have a mixed environment-some users need stricter rules than others. You apply those through Password Settings Objects in AD. It took me a bit to wrap my head around it at first, but now I swear by it for segmenting access. Or maybe integrate with Azure AD if your setup's hybrid, but stick to on-prem for pure Server hardening.
Then there's auditing accounts. You turn on logon audits, success and failure, so you spot weird attempts. I review those logs weekly, feeding them into a SIEM if you're fancy, but even basic Event Viewer works. Windows Defender ties in here too, because strong policies reduce the attack surface it has to watch. You know, fewer weak accounts mean less malware trying to spread via credentials. I configure Defender to scan for credential theft behaviors, like Mimikatz patterns, and it alerts on suspicious process injections. But pair that with your policies-it's not just antivirus; it's the whole defense layer.
Perhaps you're dealing with shared workstations or terminal services. Enforce per-user policies there. I once fixed a setup where everyone used the same service account for TS logons-huge risk. So, I switched to individual accounts with unique passwords, managed via GPO. And for delegation? You restrict what services can impersonate users. Kerberos settings in the policy let you control ticket lifetimes, cutting down on replay attacks. I've adjusted the max renewal period to 10 hours; keeps things fresh without constant re-auths.
But what if you have legacy apps that hate strong passwords? I get it, they choke on special characters. So, you create a workaround account with a compliant password, but isolate it-run the app in a sandbox or use AppLocker to limit its reach. You audit its usage closely. Or use protected users group in AD; members there get extra scrutiny, no NTLM auth, stronger encryption. I add my domain admins to it, forces everything to Kerberos. It breaks some old stuff sometimes, so test in a lab first. You know how I do that? Spin up a VM, mirror your prod config, poke around.
Now, let's talk enforcement. You deploy these via GPO linked to your OU structure. I name them clearly, like "Password-Strict" for finance users. And test propagation-gpupdate /force on a machine, then gpresult to verify. If it doesn't apply, check inheritance blocking or filtering. I've chased ghosts like that for hours. Also, educate your users; I send quick emails reminding them why strong passwords matter, without scaring them. Makes compliance easier.
Or consider multi-factor for accounts. You layer that on top, especially for remote access. Windows Hello for Business works great on Server setups with domain join. I enable it, requiring biometrics or pins alongside passwords. Reduces phishing risks big time. And for passwords that must be stored? Use LAPS to randomize local admin passwords across machines. You deploy the GPO, and it pushes unique ones, stored in AD securely. I check the LAPS UI weekly; lifesaver for endpoint management.
Then, monitor for policy drift. You schedule regular audits with tools like Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer. I run it monthly, flags any loosened settings. And integrate with Defender's attack surface reduction rules-they block exploits that target weak auth. You know, things like disabling SMBv1 if you're not using it, but that's more network hardening. Stick to accounts: enforce secure RPC, limit anonymous access. I block null sessions in the policy; old trick attackers love.
Perhaps you're scaling to multiple sites. Replicate policies carefully via sites and services. I had a branch office once where GPO didn't sync right, left accounts vulnerable. So, now I verify with rsop.msc on remote machines. And for passwords in transit? Always TLS 1.2 minimum, enforced in the registry via GPO. You disable weaker ciphers too.
But don't forget service principal names. Duplicate SPNs cause auth failures. I use setspn to check and fix. Keeps Kerberos humming. Or use constrained delegation for services that need to act as users-safer than unconstrained. I configure it for my SQL servers; they impersonate without full trust.
Also, watch for password spraying attacks. Your lockout policy helps, but add account analysis in logs. I script simple PowerShell to flag multiple failures across accounts. Ties back to Defender's behavioral monitoring. You enable it for credential access detections.
Now, in a domain controller scenario, you handle RODCs carefully. Password replication policy decides what gets cached. I deny sensitive accounts from replicating to read-only DCs. Keeps them secure at remote spots. And for trusts? Enforce SID filtering, quarantine if needed.
Or maybe you're auditing password changes. You log those events, review for patterns. I set up alerts for mass resets-could be an insider issue. And use fine-grained auditing in GPO for object access on AD.
Then, consider just-in-time admin access. Privileged Access Workstations or JIT elevation via tools like PIM. I pilot that in labs; elevates rights temporarily. Reduces standing privileges.
But what about guest accounts in workgroups? Even non-domain servers need hardening. Local policy applies there. I mirror domain settings as much as possible.
Also, enforce password filters if you want custom rules. Write a DLL, register it-advanced, but I did it once for length enforcement beyond defaults.
Perhaps integrate with certificate services for smart cards. You issue them, revoke when needed. Stronger than passwords alone.
Now, for recovery, you plan for forgotten passwords. Self-service reset via AD, but with questions or MFA. I enable it, cuts helpdesk tickets.
Or use shadow principals for testing policies without risking prod accounts. Clever trick I picked up.
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